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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORA H. STEVENS, CONNIE JOY 
LEIGHT, JACK HOLT STEVENS 
and ALICE DAYLE ESPLIN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
COLORADO FUEL & IRON, a corpora-
tion, for whom UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION has been 
substituted, and EMPLOYERS MU-
TUAL OF WAUSAU, a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Before answering any arguments made by the Appel-
lants to support their claim, the Respondent United States 
Steel Corporation invites the Court's attention to the fact 
that this appeal is taken from a memorandum decision 
rendered by Judge Nelson Day of the District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah, dismissing the action for the reason 
that the Complaint as amended did not state a cause of 
action. Appellants' principal thrust against the holding in 
the memorandum is on the grounds that the Trial Court 
failed "to grasp the situation that the Plaintiffs are faced 
Case No. 
11818 
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with". If the Trial Judge did fail in that regard, which we 
doubt, the situation he faced was the difficult task of in-
terpreting the allegations of a Complaint which is not a 
model of clarity. Its style of structure is such that imma-
terial, irrelevant and confusing subjects are blended with 
redundant facts in sudh a manner that Counsel for Respon-
dent find themselves in the same situation as the Trial 
Judge. 
As amended, the Complaint remotely suggests two 
possible legal theories for recovery: (1) That Utah Con-
struction, decedent's employer and hereafter referred to as 
"Utah", was an agent of Respondent, and as principal is 
chargeable with Utah's negligence; and (2) that because 
Respondent had some interest in ore stocked by Utah on 
Utah's own land, Respondent had a duty continuously to 
inspect Utah's operations, and if they resulted in creating 
unsafe conditions on Utah's Low Grade Dump # 8 , then 
Respondent had a duty to have them rendered safe. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Respondent is the owner of certain mining claims lo-
cated in the Lindsay Hill Mine area, Iron Springs Mining 
District, Township 35, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, known and designated as the Little Allie and 
Cora Groups. Utah is the owner of numerous other mining 
claims in the same District and it uses some of them for 
the purpose of dumping and storing low-grade ore. Of 
particular importance to this decision is that Low Grade 
Dump # 8 , the place of the accident, is located on lands 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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owned by Utah and not the Respondent. (A map for illus-
trative purposes will be used at the arguments.) 
The Amended Complaint correctly alleges that decedent 
was an employee of Utah and that he had been employed 
by that Corporation for a substantial period of time. He 
was familiar with the area. On the particular day of the 
tragedy, he was performing his duties as a driver of a large 
dump truck. The method of operation used by Utah in 
handling ore in the area involved was to dig the ore from 
mining claims of Respondent, claims owned by other com-
panies and from its own property. After the ore was 
severed from the ground, it would be loaded on one of 
Utah's trucks and from there, the vehicle would be driven 
to one of a number of low-grade dumps, Which was desig-
nated by Utah, and then dumped. The mining, loading, 
hauling and dumping were by personnel employed by and 
under the exclusive control and direction of Utah, and the 
land upon which the ore was placed was owned by it. There 
are no averments that the Respondent had any right, title 
or interest in or to the land upon which the dumps were 
located. 
The Amended Complaint contains some conclusions to 
the effect that the contract placed responsibility for min-
ing, moving, stockpiling and shipping on Respondent, but 
fails to aver any fact which shows that the Respondent had 
any duty to control, supervise and direct the operation. 
Apart from the conclusions of the Amended Complaint that 
its practical effect is otherwise, the language of the docu-
ment as alleged cannot be tortured to mean anything other 
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than that Respondent's only obligation was to pay Utah 
for the ore after its value had been determined. 
Utah Construction and Mining Company is a large 
company with qualified employees in charge of its mining 
operations. It was unfettered in its control and method 
of extracting, hauling and piling of ore in the Iron Springs 
Mining District. There is no averment in the Amended 
Complaint which charges Respondent with knowledge that 
Utah was not qualified to perform mining operations in a 
careful and proper manner, or that Respondent was care-
less in selecting Utah as an independent contractor. 
According to the Complaint as amended, a few days 
before the accident Utah had undercut Low Grade Dump 
# 8 , and by virtue of this undercutting, the dump was left 
in a dangerous condition. Furthermore, it is alleged that 
the Respondent knew, or should have known, that during 
the few days of this undercutting, Utah had weakened the 
east end of the dump and thus made the unloading of trucks 
on that portion of the stockpile dangerous. Facts are not 
stated which support that naked conclusion. The following 
allegations seem to be pertinent as to Appellant's claim 
that Respondent was chargeable with any actual knowledge, 
other than such as might be imputed through UtaJh: 
"The Utah Construction and Mining Company 
actually did the earth moving and the ore moving 
on a contract basis at a stated price per ton, al-
though the instrument under which this was being 
done contained language of a lease. Said Utah Con-
struction and Mining Company ivas at all times an 
agent of the United States Steel Corporation, for 
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the sole purpose of furnishing iron ore to the 
Geneva Works . . ." 
"and the practical effect of said agreement has 
been that it is an operating agreement for the min-
ing of iron ore by Utah Construction and Mining 
Company as an agent for United States Steel Cor-
poration." 
"That the above entitled court set aside what is 
claimed to be a lease agreement between Columbia 
Iron Mining Company and Utah Construction & 
Mining Company, and designate said instrument to 
be nothing but an operation agreement by the terms 
of which Utah Construction & Mining Company is 
an agent of United States Steel Corporation to mine, 
stockpile and load iron ore on railroad cars at a 
stated price per ton." (Emphasis added.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COM-
PLAINT, APPELLANTS ARE LIMITED TO 
THE RELIEF PROVIDED FOR BY TITLE 35, 
CHAPTER 1, SECTION 60, UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953 (WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION). 
Appellants must fail on their contention that the Re-
spondent is liable under the doctrine of principal and agent 
or employer-employee, for the reason that under that theory 
they would be limited to the exclusive relief provided for 
by Title 35, Chapter 1, Section 60, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). This section is as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
"The right to recover compensation pursuant 
to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained 
by an employee, Whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by 
this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, 
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury 
or death in any way connected, sustained, aggra-
vated because of or arising out of his employment, 
and no action at law may be maintained against an 
employer . . . based upon any accident, injury or 
death of an employee." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized the ex-
dusiveness of the Workmen's Compensation remedy pro-
vided by the statute. In the case of Hailing v. Industrial 
Com'n, 71 Utah 112, 263 Pae. 78 (1927), the Court con-
strued an early Utah Workmen's Compensation Law which 
was worded similar to the language in the present Code. 
The earlier law provided that compensation would be the 
exclusive remedy with the exception, that if the injury was 
caused by the employer's willful misconduct, a negligence 
action could be maintained. In setting out its interpreta-
tion of that act, the Court said: 
"[Under Utah's law], it is only in the case of 
an injury caused by the employer's willful miscon-
duct that an injured employee, or, in case the injury 
results in death, his dependents, may recover dam-
ages in an action at law for a wrongful injury. 
When the injury is caused merely by the negligent 
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act of the employer, the injured employee, or, when 
the injury causes death, his dependents, must be 
content to accept the compensation provided for in 
the act." 
Again, in Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining 
& Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P. 2d 612, 616 (1948), this 
Court interpreted the meaning of a later law which reads 
similar to the present statute. The language therein used 
was this: 
"Many decisions have indicated that the act 
operated on the employer-employee relationship, 
and that coexistence with the charge was an abro-
gation of the employee's common law right to sue 
the employer for any and all injuries suffered while 
in the course of his employment, except in those 
cases where the employer was not subject to the 
act or the common law remedy of the employee was 
expressly reserved by the act." 
The exclusive remedy rule is not unique to Utah. Many 
other jurisdictions have recognized that Workmen's Com-
pensation is in lieu of any other common law remedy. For 
brevity reasons, we cite only from decisions in two neigh-
boring states. The Nevada Supreme Court in the case of 
Las Vegas - Tonopah-Reno State Lines, Inc. V. Nevada In-
dustrial Com'n, 81 Nev. 626, 408 P. 2d 241, (1965) con-
strued Nevada's Workmen's Compensation Law as follows: 
"Once it is determined by the commission or by 
a court that a covered employee has sustained a 
personal injury arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, compensation therefor is limited to 
that provided by the act." 408 P. 2d at 243. 
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In In Re Lockard, 76 Idaho 506, 285 P. 2d 473, 
476 (1955), the Idaho Supreme Court has given the Idaho 
statute a like construction: 
"We have consistently held that the remedy pro-
vided by the compensation law is exclusive in all 
cases arising out of employment not excepted from 
its provisions." 
The foregoing discussion could terminate this brief 
if it were not for the exception which is provided in Title 
35, Chapter 1, Section 62, Utah Code Annotated, which pro-
vides : 
"When any injury or death for which compensa-
tion is payable under this title shall have been 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, the injured em-
ployee or in case of death his dependents, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also have an action 
for damages against such third person." 
Since compensation bars recovery against the em-
ployer, but not against third parties who are not connected 
in with the employment, it becomes important to determine 
who is an "employer". The Utah Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act Utah Code Annotated §35-1-42 provides the ap-
propriate answer: 
". . . Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over 
whose work he retains supervision or control, and 
such work is a part or process in the trade or busi-
ness of the employer, such contractor and all per-
sons employed by him, and all subcontractors under 
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tractors shall be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original employer." 
The same statute then goes on to provide that when 
the contractor is an independent contractor, he and not the 
original employer is deemed the employer within the mean-
ing of the Act. An independent contractor is then defined 
as one who — 
"Is not subject to the rule or control of the em-
ployer, is engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to 
the employer only in effecting a result in accordance 
with the employer's design." 
It is interesting to note that in this jurisdiction the 
same criteria is used in determinng both the master and 
servant relatonship under the act and the principal-agent 
relationship which Appellants claim exists between U. S. 
Steel and Utah Construction Company. For example, the 
Utah Supreme Court said in Thiokol Chemical Corp. V. 
Peterson, 15 Utah 2d 355, 393 P. 2d 319 (1964) : 
"The line of demarcation between one who op-
erates as an independent contractor as opposed to 
one who is the servant or agent of another is some-
times a bit blurred. This court has on a number of 
occasions confronted this problem and set forth var-
ious criteria to be considered in making the proper 
classification. The most fundamental one relates to 
the extended control by the one who hires over the 
one who performs the service. If the employer's 
will is represented only by a desired result, the in-
dication is of an independent contractor; whereas, 
if the employer exercises control over the means of 
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accomplishing the result, this points toward an 
agent or servant relationship." 15 Utah 2d at 358. 
This holding is consistent with that reached by the 
Utah Court in Parkinson V. Industrial Comni'n, 110 Utah 
309, 172 P. 2d 136, 139 (1946) which discusses the exact 
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act and states: 
"From these definitions it is apparent that 
whether a workman is an 'employee' or an 'inde-
pendent contractor' is dependent on (1) whether 
the employer has the right to control his execution 
of the work, (2) whether the work done or to be 
done is a part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, and (3) whether the work done or to 
be done is a definite job or piece work . . . The most 
important of the determinatives of the relationship 
between workmen and employer is that of control." 
The Court again used almost precisely the same lan-
guage in the more recent case of Plewe Const Co. v. In-
dustrial Com'n, 121 Utah 375, 242 P. 2d 561, 562 (1952) : 
"[Even though the relationship of the con-
tractor to the company] 'might be characterized by 
some of the elements incident to the relationship of 
independent contractors' the test of whether the 
company is deemed the employer where the work 
is a part or process in its trade or business, is 
whether it retains the supervision and control over 
the work of the contractor." 
The next two cited cases have indicated that where 
the relationship is found to be within the meaning of the 
Act, the sole remedy of the employee is Workmen's Com-
pensation. 
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In the case of Maryland Casualty Co. V. Industrial 
Com'n and John F. O'Brien, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P. 2d 1020 
(1961), the Supreme Court of Utah had before it a case 
involvitng an independent contractor who was performing 
work for Dames and Moore in a drilling operation. The 
Industrial Commission had found O'Brien was an employee 
covered by compensation, and that was the issue before the 
Supreme Court. The important principle announced in that 
case is found in the following language: 
"There is some dispute in the evidence, but 
more so as to the interpretation thereof, as to the 
facte bearing upon the relationship Mr. O'Brien 
bore to Dames and Moore. The latter, Soil Engi-
neers, were engaged by the Utah Power & Light 
Company to do some testing to determine why its 
power plant at Castle Dale was sinking. Dames and 
Moore engaged Mr. O'Brien and his partner, broth-
er-in-law, James Phizackles, to provide and operate 
a cable tool drilling rig and crew for drilling and 
sampling the soil strata underlying the power plant. 
It is to be conceded that as between the parties, Mr. 
O'Brien was not considered as an employee by 
Dames and Moore. They did not so carry him on 
their books, nor withhold any income tax or social 
security for him, nor make any other deductions 
from the money paid for his services. Nevertheless, 
there is evidence concerning the manner of carrying 
out this project which supports the Commission's 
finding that Mr. O'Brien should be regarded as an 
employee: the payment was to foe made by the shift, 
rather than for a completed job; Dames and Moore 
kept a supervisor, Mr. Donald E. Nelson, on the 
job and he was there 95% of the time and perform-
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ing that function; he fixed the length of the shift 
to be worked and determined whether they would 
work on weekends. He gave directions where to set 
up the rig and to dig the hole; how deep they should 
dig, when to bail out and clean the hole; when and 
where to take samples and when not satisfied to 
take a new one; when to stop and when to resume 
drilling. 
"It is our opinion that this evidence, in the 
light of the rules hereinabove discussed, provides a 
reasonable basis for the conclusion that Mr. O'Brien 
was an employee within the meaning of Sec. 35-1-
42 quoted above, and therefore covered by the In-
dustrial Compensation Act." 12 Utah 2d at 226. 
A slight variation in the principles above discussed can 
be found in Cook V. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 
20, 286 P. 2d 616 (1963), where the Court laid down the 
rule that when companies or individuals are united for a 
common purpose for their mutual benefits they each may be 
held employers and subject to the coverage and protection 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Coker Construc-
tion Company had obtained a contract for the construction 
of a diversion tunnel at the Flaming Gorge Dam. Coker en-
tered into an agreement with the defendant Kiewit to pool 
their efforts in constructing the diversion tunnel, sharing in 
the profits and losses as a result. The plaintiff Cook was an 
employee of Coker and was injured in the course of his em-
ployment. He recovered compensation from Coker and then 
commenced a negligence action against Kiewit. There was 
little or no evidence that Kiewit in fact had any control over 
the actions of Cook as an employee of Coker. The Court, 
however, denied Cook's cause of action. The Court placed 
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the emphasis not upon any element of control, but upon 
the fact that both companies were united in a common pur-
pose or goal. 
"Being so united for a common purpose for 
mutual profit, these companies became partners in 
a venture just the same as if two individuals had 
entered into it, and whatever one company and its 
employees did in furthering the project would enure 
to the benefit of the other. Accordingly, it would 
seem that Coker's act in paying premiums for work-
men's compensation to protect itself against loss 
should also enure to the benefit of Kiewit and vice 
versa. It also follows that under such arrangement, 
the partnership entity should be regarded as the 
employing unit; and the employees of both com-
panies as engaged in the same employment." 15 
Utah2da t23 . 
The Court then went on to point out that a recovery 
in such a ssituation would be in effect an unjust windfall to 
the employee or his dependents. 
"Another facet of the situation which should 
not be overlooked is that to permit the employee to 
sue the defendant Kiewit under these circumstances, 
where it is part of the employing unit, would not 
be in conformity with the design of the Act insofar 
as the employee is concerned. It is obviously in-
tended that in consideration of the certainty of com-
pensation the Act affords him, he should forego the 
right to sue the employer for injury. Sanctioning 
this action will allow him in effect to 'have his cake 
and eat it too' by getting the certain Workmen's 
Compensation and also the rigiht to sue the employ-
ing unit for another and possibly greater recovery 
for his injury." 15 Utah 2d at 24. 
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In concluding this facet of the brief, we reemphasize 
that Appellants have alleged facts and conclusions which 
bring them within the sweep of the foregoing authorities. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT DID NOT OWE A DUTY TO 
DECEASED TO MAINTAIN UTAH'S PREM-
ISES IN A SAFE CONDITION OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, IF THEY WERE DANGER-
OUS, TO WARN HIM OF THEIR CONDITION. 
The second legal basis which appears possibly raised 
by the Appellants' Amended Compaint is that the Respon-
dent owed some duty to the deceased to keep Utah's prem-
ises safe; or in the alternative, to make regular inspections 
and if unsafe conditions were observed, to notify deceased 
of the danger. 
For the purpose of argument, Respondent will take th^ 
position that the decedent may have been a business visitor 
for a limited purpose. However, that is just the beginning 
of the proposition and not the end. Conceding the relation-
ship, it existed only as to Utah, and not as to Respondent. 
The deceased was an employee of Utah and the relationship 
of employer and employee existed. That would entitle de-
ceased to a reasonable assurance by Utah as his employer 
that he was working under safe conditions, but it would 
not saddle any obligation on the Respondent. Implicit in the 
theory that premises must be kept reasonably safe for a 
business visitor is the proposition that the person responsi-
ble for the dangerous condition must own, lease or control 
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the premises and have the authority to extend an invitation 
to the party injured for the purposes for which the visit is 
being made. In the instant case, the deceased at the time 
of his injury was on Utah's land at Utah's invitation. Cer-
tainly the Respondent did not have the right to hold out any 
invitation to him to go on his employer's land; nor is it 
asserted that it did so directly or indirectly. Protection 
afforded by the status of invitee can be created only by the 
owner of the land or one charged with the responsibility of 
maintaining the premises for those rightfully thereon, and 
here the Respondent is not in the class of an invitor. 
There are no allegations that Respondent had any 
authority to determine when and where the deceased would 
work, the area where ore would be dumped, the position on 
the dump where the load would be dropped, and the area 
from which the ore would be removed each day, or to direct 
the movement of Utah's vehicles. While it is alleged that 
Respondent had engineers somewhere in Southern Utah, it 
is not averred that they were employed on the property in-
volved and neither is it alleged that they performed any 
duties for Utah. There are no facts stated which show they 
had any reason or duty to travel to Utah's land and there 
to inspect that corporation's premises, and direct it to take 
any action to render the premises safe. There is no allega-
tion that they had any right or power to interfere with the 
directions Utah gave its employees to operate in any spe-
cific manner or to work in specific places. In the absence 
of averments showing to the contrary for the Court to 
hold otherwise would be to take management and control 
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away from the officers, directors and managers of Utah 
and place those responsibilities on Respondent. 
Finally, in regards to this aspect of the case, Appel-
lants do allege that Respondent owned the ore which was 
stored on Low Grade Dump # 8 , and for the purposes of 
this appeal we must assume that to be the case. However, 
that does not establish that the owner is liable for any in-
juries arising out of its storage. Surely it follows as a 
matter of law that when the ore no longer was a part of 
the land, it became personal property, and when it was 
hauled beyond the boundaries of Respondent's claim, Utah 
was solely responsible for the manner in which it was 
handled. 
These are the relevant allegations in the Complaint 
which bring the last proposition into issue: 
". . . United States Steel Corporation became the 
true owner of the Little Allie mining claim from 
which said ore was being hauled and the other 
claims identified herein and was the owner of the 
ore in the stockpile known as Low Grade Stockpile 
# 8 . " (Emphasis added.) 
And 
"Said agreement allowed Utah Construction Com-
pany to stockpile ore and to turn it to the United 
States Steel Corporation, defendant, at a later date, 
and as a matter of practice, said Utah Construction 
Mining Company would place the ore in stockpiles 
in which the ownership and identity of the same are 
maintained, until said ore was shipped and used." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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It is significant to note that there is no allegation that 
Respondent owned the land where Low Grade Stockpile # 8 
was located; the reason for that omission is that it was 
owned by Utah. Fairly construing the language in the last 
quotations in favor of Appellants, it raises a possible issue 
involving the duties and obligations of a bailor of property 
to a third party who has been injured by the negligence of 
the bailee. We, therefore, look to the law of negligence 
growing out of that status. 
A bailor of property is not chargeable with the negli-
gence of a bailee. Conklin V. WaMi, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 
2d 437 (1948), Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed, 1 Utah 2d 308, 
265 P. 2d 1013 (1954). The rule enunciated in the above-
cited case is further enunciated in Bailments, 8 Am. Jur. 
2d §259 at 1144: 
"The relationship of bailor and bailee is not, as 
such, within the doctrine of respondeat superior; 
the general rule at common law, both in bailment 
for gratuitous use and in lettings for hire, is that 
the bailor cannot be held responsible to a third per-
son for injuries resulting from his bailee's negligent 
use of the bailed property in the absence of any con-
trol exercised by the bailor at the time or of negli-
gence of his own which proximately contributed to 
the injuries. Such a liability could only be sustained 
on the theory that a bailor stands in the relation of 
principal or master to the bailee." 
Perhaps a short hypothetical situation based on facts 
different from those alleged in this case will suffice to show 
that if Appellants are relying on ownership of the ore as 
placing a duty on Respondent, their trust is bottomed on a 
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broken reed. If an owner turns over his household furni-
ture to a van and storage company to be later returned to 
him, it is improperly stored, and an employee of the com-
pany is injured because of the negligent storage, we suggest 
that the bailor of the property is not liable. 
It would indeed be a great departure from the rule of 
any known case to have this Court burden an owner of 
inert personal property piled on a third party's real prop-
erty with a responsibility to regularly inspect and reassess 
the possibility of third parties being injured by the manner 
of storage. While it is true an owner of real property is 
charged with the duty to keep his land reasonably safe for 
invitees, that rule cannot be extended to cases of bailees 
and bailors. Common sense dictates that the duties of a 
bailor should not be expanded to require constant vigilance 
over personal property and to make certain it is handled 
and stored in such a way that injury will not result to third 
parties. Personal property is transitory and an owner could 
not reasonably Mlow it from place to place. Here the 
bailee and the possessor was Utah, and it alone would be 
responsible for the death of the decedent. To hold other-
wise would overturn a long and well established line of 
authorities. 
Very little need be said about the authorities cited by 
Appellants for the reason that if they are material, they 
support Respondent. For example, in Rogalski v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 (1954), the de-
fendant maintained a platform for use in cleaning its trucks. 
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Plaintiff stumbled into a vat of caustic soda which was only 
two inches from the platform. Defendant had acquiesced in 
the use of the steam-cleaning equipment. Plaintiff claimed 
he was a business visitor and Defendant answered that he 
was a trespasser. The jury found for the Plaintiff, and this 
holding placed responsibility on the Defendant because by 
acquiescing in the use of its premises, it invited the injured 
party to use its facilities. That rule, if it could be applied 
in this case, would place the blame on Utah and not on the 
Respondent, for any acquiescence here was by Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Complaint 
herein as amended does not state a daim upon which relief 
can be granted, and the decision of the Court below dis-
missing the case was correct. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE 
GEORGE W. LATIMER 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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